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introduCtion
M any political analysts and even some prominent economists put the blame for the current economic crisis in Europe on the euro. In their view, the crisis 
showed that the European Monetary Union has no future. Right 
from the beginning of the current crisis, these pundits proclaimed 
that the demise of the euro was imminent. As if hit by a kind of 
amnesia, these authors seem to forget that it was the American 
real estate market from where the crisis spread and that not only 
members of the European Monetary Union suffer from economic 
malaise but also many other countries, which do not belong to the 
euro. Those who proclaim a euro crisis seem to ignore that there 
are countries in the euro zone that are doing relatively well and 
that the severe crisis is limited to some countries in the Southern 
periphery of the euro area, most prominently to Greece. Other 
than by proclaiming massive contagion, there has never been a 
solid reason how an economy the size of Greece, which represents 
a small part of the total gross domestic product of the Eurozone, 
could bring down the European Monetary Union. 
The very same authors who announced the imminent demise 
of the euro do not propose that highly diverse countries such as 
the United States itself should get rid of their common currency 
despite the fact that the current crisis has had quite different 
economic impacts on the various regions of the United States. 
According to the thesis that a common currency would require 
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homogenous conditions, Brazil, for example, would have to install 
at least five or seven different currencies in its territory.
The use of a common currency is surely not without negative 
consequences, yet these costs of a single currency stand against the 
costs that have to be borne when within a highly integrated region 
every country, even the smallest, should have its own currency. 
Theoretically, there is no point in claiming homogeneity as a 
precondition for a single currency. By this standard, any large city 
should have a multitude of currencies. In fact, the difference that 
we find in most cities in terms of income per capita in its various 
districts are often larger than those that exist among countries. 
Likewise, the old­fashioned thesis that a common currency would 
require a homogeneous exposure to external shocks would prohibit 
a common currency for most large cities and for most countries 
of the world with exception of those countries whose economy is 
concentrated only in one sector, such as oil, for example. 
Taking the focus on cities it also becomes clear that one more 
popular argument against common currencies does not hold. 
Most large cities are not only economically highly heterogeneous; 
they also do not possess full sovereignty, as they are subject in 
various areas to the authority of the whole country, to the central 
government and the government of their individual State. As it is 
the case with countries, it also applies to cities that not only a few 
of them will do better when monetary sovereignty is beyond their 
control. There is no need to have political sovereignty in order to 
have a common currency. 
The decision to take part in monetary union is the result of 
the evaluation of a trade­off between the pros and cons of being 
in or out of the monetary union. We have to investigate whether 
this evaluation was not careful enough and whether it followed or 
not from an erroneous analysis. Along with that, we also have to 
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ask whether the project of a common European currency should 
be abandoned or whether serious efforts should be made to 
consolidate the common currency. 
origins of tHe Current Crisis 
The euro crisis has an American origin and it has a monetary 
origin. Monetary policy had entered center stage of economic 
policy making in the late 1970s. Since then financial markets have 
emerged as sectors of high economic growth fed by a rising stream 
of new money (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: United States Adjusted Monetary Base
This trend of monetary expansion has continued over the time 
of the change of the millennium. After the outbreak of the current 
financial crisis there was a veritable explosion of the monetary 
base (see figure 1). With the internet boom over, the US Federal 
Reserve System embarked upon a policy of extremely low interest 
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rate in order to stimulate the American economy and to prevent 
the recession from deepening. While the central bank succeeded in 
preventing a prolonged slump of the American economy, it created 
a new bubble in the form of the American real estate boom. 
In 2008, the American real estate bubble burst and the 
consequences spread across the globe. Since then not only the US 
economy is in a prolonged stagnation, but also large parts of 
Europe. The global financial crisis brought about a reassessment 
of creditworthiness when lenders began to differentiate more 
carefully among the borrowers as to their payment capacity. 
As to the countries that form the euro area, this reassessment of 
the creditworthiness led to rising interest rate in several countries 
exactly at a point in time when these countries needed to increase 
their borrowing in the face of the recession. The main victims of 
this change were the countries for which the new acronym “PIIGS” 
was invented: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain.
The so­called “euro crisis” began in earnest in 2010 when it 
became apparent that Greece would not be able to meet its public 
debt obligations (ECB 2013). The adoption of the euro by Greece 
had brought immense advantages for this country in terms of 
interest payments. Yet when the financial crisis came, the euro 
has functioned as a constraint. Even as the euro is not a foreign 
currency for Greece, because this country is part of the system of 
European central banks, the fact that the country’s central bank 
cannot autonomously decide on the money supply, makes Greek 
debt in euros de facto a foreign currency debt. The membership to 
a common currency blocks the usual escape that is in place for a 
country whose debt is in its own national currency. When debt 
is denominated in national currency, the national central bank 
can devalue the national debt by inflating its currency. Yet when a 
country that forms part of currency union is threatened by default, 
government and cannot inflate its currency at will. Greece cannot 
devalue its debt through inflation and currency depreciation 
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because it has a money, which is managed by a supranational body 
in the form of the European Central Bank (ECB). In this case the 
country must apply so­called “austerity measures”, which involves 
cuts of public spending. It is easy to see that a financial crisis 
tends to become an economic crisis and finally turn into a social 
and political crisis. This happened most severely in Greece while 
Portugal and Spain are still under the threat of a similar fate. 
nAtionAl versus internAtionAl CurrenCy systems
In the face of the current “euro crisis”, the question arises 
why a group of European countries decided to launch a common 
currency and why up to now the group of the countries that form 
the euro zone has grown to 17 members (see table 1). Additionally, 
one must ask whether the promoters of the currency union 
were fully aware of its consequences for the conduct of domestic 
economic policy. The answer to these questions is quite clear: 
The promoters of the euro knew from the start what a common 
currency would imply for the conduct of domestic policies. It was 
also obvious that there is a trade­off involved when a country opts 
for a membership. The decision to join the euro area has been a 
voluntary decision. The decision to say yes to a monetary union 
requires a careful evaluation and it is without doubt that the 
decision to join has been based on such evaluations. The decision 
to opt for membership in the Eurozone reflects the experience of 
monetary chaos. The disastrous consequences of the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods System for European economic integration 
were a dark reminder of the interwar period when Europe suffered 
from the absence of a common monetary arrangement. In this 
respect, the euro is not a recent project. The aim to establish a 
common currency has been on the agenda since the start of the 
European economic integration process and definite plans were 
already launched in the late 1960s (see table 1).
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Table 1: Timeline of European Monetary Union 1970-2009
Year Steps taken
1970
The Werner Report, named after Luxembourg’s then Prime Minister and Finance Minister, sets 
out a three-stage approach to EMU – which is shelved because of difficult economic conditions 
in the early 1970s.
1978
The European Monetary System is launched, consisting of an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
and the European currency unit (ECU)
1989
The Delors Report (named after the then Commission President Jacques Delors) maps out the road 
to EMU in three stages
1990
Launch of the first stage of EMU: closer economic policy coordination and the liberalization of 
capital movements
1992
Signature of the Maastricht Treaty setting out the timetable for Economic and Monetary Union 
and the convergence criteria that Member States will be required to meet to participate in EMU
1994
Start of the second stage of EMU: creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI). Member 
States are required to work to fulfil the five convergence criteria on inflation, interest rates, 
government deficit and debt, and exchange rate stability
1995
Madrid EU summit: The single currency is named ‘the euro’, and the scenario for the third stage of 
EMU – the introduction of the euro – is set out, with a three year transition period between the 
introduction of the new currency and the launch of euro cash
1997
The Stability and Growth Pact is agreed at the Amsterdam EU summit, to ensure that Member 
States maintain budgetary discipline in EMU. The European Council also agrees on the revised 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) which links the euro and currencies of non-participating 
Member States
1998 May 1-3
The European Council agrees to launch the third stage of EMU on 1 January 1999 and that 11 
of the 15 Member States meet the criteria to adopt the single currency. These are: Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. 
It establishes the European Central Bank, which replaces the EMI as of 1 June 1998
1998
June 1st
The European Central Bank starts operating with a mandate to decide and conduct monetary 
policy for the euro area. The primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability 
1998
Dec 31
The exchange rates between the euro and the currencies of the Member States that will adopt the 
euro are irrevocably fixed as from 1 January 1999
1999
Jan 1st








Euro banknotes and coins are introduced in the 12 euro-area Member States
2007
Jan 1st
Slovenia becomes the 13th member of the euro area in 2007
2008
Jan 1st






Estonia becomes 17th member of the Eurozone
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (with 
additions by the author) <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu10/timeline_en.pdf>.
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The fact that nowadays many countries have their own 
national currency does not make national currencies the natural 
way of things. In fact, during most of history, the dominant 
monetary regime was the existence of an international system. 
Money in circulation existed mainly in gold coins or in silver 
coins. Irrespective of their local origins, precious metal coins 
moved freely across borders. Coins served as a means of payment 
according to the value of their content of precious metals. The 
introduction of national paper monies did not do away with 
the internationality of the monetary system. As long as the 
countries defined the exchange rate of the paper note in terms 
of physical gold at which national central bank would exchange 
at wish, they automatically became members of the international 
gold standard ­ as it was the case for large parts of the 19th 
century. This monetary system of the international gold standard 
was international in its functioning and it was the intention when 
joining to take away from governments the control of money. 
This system broke down with the onset of World War I when the 
belligerent countries abandoned the gold standard in order to gain 
full sovereignty over their money supply to finance the war efforts. 
It would not take long and the consequences of the nationalization 
of money would show up in the form of hyperinflation, currency 
wars and the Great Depression as forerunners to the follow­up of 
World War I in the form of World War II.
For the founders of the international post World War II 
monetary order the perils of national monies and nationalistic 
economic policy were still vivid and it was the common aim to 
establish a system that would prevent the return of monetary 
nationalism. The most comprehensive plan of global monetary order 
came from the British delegation led by the economist John 
Maynard Keynes. He wanted to install a kind of global central 
bank that would emit its own global currency, which he baptized 
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as “Bancor” – signaling that it would be a “bank” money, which 
would issue a money as good as gold: “or” – the French name for 
gold. Keynes did not succeed to have his plan realized. Instead, 
the American delegation won out (BOUGHTON 2002). The new 
system received the name Bretton Woods according to the place 
of the conference. The Bretton Woods international monetary 
system, although not international in its design, was international 
in its consequence as it became the dominant monetary system in 
that part of the world where the United States dominated as the 
new hegemon.
The Bretton Woods System provided a huge benefit for 
European integration. European integration in the 1950s and 
1960s could not have advanced without a kind of common 
currency. At this time, the US dollar played this role as it served as 
an international money for trade and currency reserves. 
As is quite clear that that deeper economic integration 
cannot take place without stable currency arrangements, the 
demise of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s became 
a major challenge for the Europeans. As soon as it became clear 
that the dollar standard would fall apart, the Europeans launched 
the project of a common currency. The first plans go back to 1970 
with the so­called Werner Plan. Various steps were taken on the 
way to a common currency such as “the snake” along with several 
other currency arrangements. Along the way, it became obvious 
that deeper economic integration requires a reliable common 
currency system. With the dollar out of question and the anchoring 
of the system to the German mark problematic for various reasons 
(politically, economically, and as to the relative size of the then 
West German economy to the rest of the European bloc), a proper 
European currency of its own emerged as the most preferable 
solution.
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performAnCe of tHe euro 
In order to understand what is going on with the so­called 
“euro­crisis”, it is helpful to put the current crisis in terms of at 
least the time span since the inception of the euro.
We begin this part of the analysis with a look at the Eurozone 
as a whole and then highlight some of the problems of individual 
countries such as Greece and Span that suffer currently from a 
severe economic crisis. 
The euro was launched as a single currency at first for banking 
transactions in 1999 and two years later on January 2002 also as a 
physical currency (see table 1).
The initial exchange rate of the euro was 1.16 to the US dollar 
and due to the re­shifting of portfolios of international financial 
investors, the euro declined in the first couple of month to hit a 
low of 0.87 in February 2002 (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Euro/US-dollar exchange rate 1999 -2013
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Thereafter, the euro began a steady rise until early 2008. 
A reversal set in for the euro dollar exchange rate with the 
beginning of the international financial crisis. For some time 
international investor sought refuge in the dollar as a safe haven 
but the downward trend stopped in 2010 and the exchange rate 
between the euro and US dollar has experienced little volatility as 
the rate stabilizes of around 1.3 dollars to the euro. Despite the 
warnings of doom and gloom for the euro zone with the call for 
the imminent break­up of the Eurozone at the beginning of the 
crisis and thereafter, not only the euro exchange rate has stabilized 
since then, but the euro area has also held together. While since the 
beginning of the crisis, no member country has left the zone, 
the euro area could actually welcome new members after the 
outbreak of the crises with Slovakia, which joined in 2009 and 
Estonia, which became a member in 2011 (see table 1). 
Looking at the overall performance of the Eurozone, its 
attraction for many countries to join, particularly for East 
European Countries, is obvious. The gross domestic product per 
capita in terms of purchasing power parity has seen a steady and 
impressive rise since the launch of the euro up to the mid of 2008, 
when, at a level of 35 000 dollars (in terms of purchasing power), 
gross domestic product (gdp) per capita has moved sideways. One 
can see in the chart below (figure 3), that the latest data for per 
capita show that the low point has been left behind and that 
currently gdp per capita has already surpassed the pre­crisis level. 
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Figure 3: Eurozone Gross domestic product per capita at 
purchasing power parity 2000-2012
In order to put the overall euro gdp performance in perspective, 
it should be noted that a major difference between the pre­crisis 
period and the current situation is still in place. While before 
the crisis all member countries of the euro zone moved largely 
along the same trend, there has been a sharp division among the 
countries since the outbreak of the crisis. While countries such as 
Germany, Austria the Netherlands have already fully recovered 
from the crisis and are experiencing economic expansion, some 
other countries, particularly those at the Southern periphery of 
the euro zone, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal are still mired 
in the depth of the economic crisis.
While in Germany the unemployment rate has drastically 
fallen since the outbreak of the crisis (see figure 4), it has exploded 
in Greece, Spain and Portugal to extreme levels.
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Figure 4: Unemployment rates for Germany, Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain since 2000 
Source: National Data, Trading economics
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Different from Germany, Greece experienced a decline of its 
unemployment rate in the years preceding the crisis (see figure 3). 
Yet when the crisis came, it experienced an extreme rise that lifted 
the unemployment rate over 25 per cent. A similar fate had Spain, 
which saw its unemployment rate decline since the mid­90s but 
then experienced a rise of its unemployment rate to the same 
exorbitantly high levels of over 25 per cent as has happened in 
Greece. 
Differences in the performance of the labor market among 
the countries that form the European currency union is also 
clearly reflected in the interest rate that the various government 
as borrowers have to pay. While before the crisis, there has been 
a common trend, and countries like Greece and could profit 
substantially by lower interest payments on its public debt, this 
common trend has given way a much more differentiated picture.
Similar to Greece, there has been a strong convergence 
of interest rates for the rest of the PIIGS up to the beginning of 
the current crisis when a strong divergence set in. Although the 
extreme degrees of divergence have gone by, significant deviations 
still exist (table 2).
178
Antony Peter Mueller








Germany 1.30 1.30 1.29
France 2.57 2.01 1.87
Italy 5.90 4.54 3.96
Ireland 7.09 4.67 3.48
Spain 6.59 5.34 4.25
Portugal 10.56 7.25 5.46
Greece 27.82 13.33 9.07
Source: European Central Bank (ECB): <http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.
en.html>.
The differentiation among the interest rates that for the 
various countries that form the euro area points to the main 
difference between the period before and after the outbreak of 
the current international financial crisis. The outbreak of the 
crisis came not only as a shock to the policymakers, most of all it 
was also a major shock for the operators on the financial markets 
themselves. For decades, these financial players had become 
accustomed to a monetary policy, which would bail them out if 
things should go wrong. That was the lesson learnt in 1987 when 
the stock market crash induced the American central bank to 
provide ample liquidity to the market and this way prepared the 
exuberant 1990s (LvMI 2008). A similar successful injection of 
liquidity occurred when the Internet bubble burst in early 2000 
when the American central bank successfully injected liquidity 
into the market making way for a period of extremely low interest 
rates. Over the past decades, there has been a highly expansionary 
monetary policy in place, which drove down interest rates in a 
cascade­like manner towards zero (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: United States policy rate of interest  
(Federal funds rate) 1979-2013
The period of extremely low interest together with the 
conviction that central banks would bailout the system in case of 
a derailment launched the search for higher yields at the expense 
of the awareness of risk. Domestically, US money swamped into 
real estate, while internationally the global liquidity avalanche 
swamped into emerging markets. For the euro currency, the targets 
for the inflow of money were those that should become the center 
of the crisis: Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The early 
attraction of these countries was that they still offered relatively 
high interest rates and in the search of higher yields seemed just as 
attractive as the US real estate market (MUELLER, 2011). Just 
as much as the American real estate market seemed safe, as much 
the countries at the Southern periphery of the euro area seemed a 
safe bet because of their membership in the euro area. 
As money from abroad flowed into countries such as Greece 
and Spain, interest rates for governments bonds would fall and 
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give rise to increase public borrowing. Apparently justified by 
lower interest rates and ample liquidity along with a domestic 
boom that in Spain centered on private consumption for real 
estate and in Greece on public consumption in form of the 
expansion of public sector employment, government deficits 
expanded. Yet both, lenders and borrowers, misinterpreted what 
was happening as a confirmation of their preconceptions as to the 
assessment of the creditworthiness of the countries involved. Not 
only banks as lenders overestimated the safety and credit capacity 
of the borrowers. The borrowers themselves also overestimated 
the safety of their borrowing and their capacity to service their 
debt. 
When the crisis hit, the usual injection of liquidity did not 
work as before. The American central bank did not hesitate to slash 
interest rates. After the outbreak of the current financial crisis, 
the American central bank rapidly lowered its policy rate (figure 5) 
in tandem with the European Central Bank to a level called “zero 
bound” when the reduction of rates has hit its limit (figure 6).
Figure 6: European Central Bank policy rate of interest  
since 2007
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The collapse of the American real estate market came as 
a shock to the financial market. After this shock followed the 
apparent inability of the central banks to revive the markets and 
likewise the failure of fiscal policy to stimulate the economy with 
tax credits and extra spending. In Europe, the fear of an imminent 
break­up of the euro area sent shock waves through the financial 
system and the specter of a global financial meltdown appeared, in 
which the demise of the euro would take down the dollar with it.
Crisis mAnAgement
As of now, the acute financial crisis has been limited to the 
smaller partner countries of the Eurozone. In terms of their gross 
domestic product, countries like Portugal and Greece represent 
only a small part. Things would turn serious, however, when the 
crisis should become acute in Spain or even Italy (see table 3).
Table 3: Gross domestic product of selected Eurozone 
countries 2009 in US dollars
Share in percent of total
Eurozone Germany France Italy Spain Greece Portugal
GDP 12,460,362 3,330,032 2,649,390 2,112,780 1,460,250 329,924 227,676
Share 100.00 26.73 21.26 16.95 11.72 2.65 1.83
Source: World Bank Data. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.
The main object of the European crisis management was to 
contain default to Greece and contain the crisis of not spreading 
to more seriously to Spain and Portugal. This way, the European 
debt crisis has led to a series of initiatives under the so­called 
“troika” (triumvirate) composed of the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
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Greece represents the country with the largest emergency 
aid. After a first bailout package of 73 billion euros, Greece 
received 163.7 billion from the newly instituted European 
Stability Fund in cooperation with the International Monetary 
Fund. As of December 2012, the European Central Bank jumped 
in and bought sovereign bonds amounting to 30.8 billion 
dollars. Along with Greece, Spain Portugal and Italy also received 
emergency aid (see table 4).
Table 4: European emergency funding (in billions of euros, 
book values as of December 31, 2012)
Euro zone and IMF EFSF and IMF ECB ESM EFSF, EFSM and IMF
Greece 73 163.7 30.8 -- --
Spain -- -- 43.7 100 --
Portugal -- -- 21.6 -- 78
Italy -- -- 99 -- --
Source: ECB, IMF, ESM book value as of December 31, 2012.
IMF – International Monetary Fund; ECB – European Central Bank; EFSF – European 
Financial Stability Facility: <http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/frydmanr/Dollar_Euro_Ex-
change_Rate.pdf>; EFSM – European Financial Stability Mechanism, <http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/>.
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) came into 
existence on May 9, 2010 by all 27 member­states of the European 
Union (EU). The EFSF has the objective to provide financial 
assistance to Eurozone member­states whose financial situation 
has become precarious and therefore need temporary financial 
assistance. The EFSF has the right to raise funds in order to 
recapitalize member states banks and buy sovereign debt from the 
member states. In order to raise funds, the Facility will issue bonds, 
which are backed by guarantees of the Eurozone member states. 
The EFSF has lending capacity of 440 euros, which may increase 
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by 60 billion euro through the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM). Together with funds from the credit line of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of 250 billion euros, the 
financial safety net amounts to 750 billion euros. 
On November 20, 2011, finance ministers of the Eurozone 
agreed to expand the financial power of the EFSF by creating 
certificates that proved a Eurozone guarantee for up to 30 percent 
of new sovereign bonds issues by Eurozone member states.
These institutions and instruments are to be fully replaced by 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which already put up 
100 billion euros in emergency aid to Spain (see table 3 above). The 
European Stability Mechanism was established on September 27, 
2012 and began its operation on October 8, 2012. Its object is to 
provide a permanent financial security mechanism for the member 
states by providing instant access to its financial assistance 
programs. The ESM has a lending capacity of 500 billion euros. 
The ESM will replace earlier programs such as the EFSM and the 
EFSF. Different from the earlier mechanisms such as the European 
Financial Security Mechanism (EFSM) and the European EFSF, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is based on a formal treaty 
(ESM 2013). In order to obtain funds, the member state is obliged 
to be a member of the European Fiscal Compact.
In order to obtain ESM aid, the country in need must accept 
the evaluation of its finances by the so­called Troika, which is 
composed of the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The first Financial 
Assistance Facility Agreement of the EMS was made in April 2013 
at the amount of 100 billion euros for the Spanish banking sector 
along with 9 billion euros for a sovereign bailout in combination 
with a financial sector recapitalization program for Cyprus. 
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The fiscal compact is one more tentative to bring the fiscal 
policies of the euro member states in line with the requirements 
of financial stability. The Maastricht Treaty, which established 
the rules of convergence for the countries that were to join the 
common currency, postulated the rule for fiscal stability by 
the criteria of a deficit of no more than three per cent and a ratio of 
public debt to gross domestic product of no more than 60 per cent. 
Yet already during the convergence process, the rules got watered 
down and ironically enough it was first Germany and France that 
violated the criteria after the launch of the euro.
Another attempt to prevent extreme divergence of fiscal 
policies among member countries came with the so­called Stability 
and Growth Pact (SPG), which set up rules for fiscal policy for all 
members of the European Union along the lines that the Maastricht 
Treaty had already established. 
Now, so it seems, some of the basic errors of the earlier 
attempts will be repeated with the Fiscal Compact. While the 
Fiscal Compact is more detailed than the previous rules, 
the problem remains that legally and in practice, it is very 
difficult to put controls on the national budgets when there is 
domestic resistance. Full compliance to conditions imposed from 
international or European bodies usually only occur in the form 
of “conditionality” under financial assistance programs the way by 
which the International Monetary Fund administers its programs. 
Besides these problems, the fiscal pact also suffers from the same 
inflexibility that characterized the Stability and Growth Pact and 
consequently led to its non­compliance when financial difficulties 
began to emerge. 
Beyond these governmental facilities, the European Central 
Bank began to become active as a bailout facility. 
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When coping with the crisis, the major change in the European 
financial landscape did not occur by way of new institutions 
and new pacts, but by the European Central Bank’s program of 
“Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). With this instrument, 
the ECB proclaimed its readiness to purchase government bonds 
on the secondary market. As the market turmoil approached its 
peak in the summer of 2012 and panic sales of sovereign bonds of 
the countries of the Southern periphery set in, the European Central 
Bank announced to act as a “lender of the last resort” (ECB 2012). 
Through this maneuver, the ECB managed to convince the financial 
market operators that it would stabilize the market. Consequently, 
the sell­off stopped and the yields of the bonds began to fall (table 2). 
It is not without irony that the major contribution in ending the 
acute phase of the euro crisis was a legally highly problematic 
measure by the central institution of the euro, the European Central 
Bank itself. With the “Outright Monetary Transactions”, the ECB 
deliberately exceeded its statutes, which explicitly forbid the 
ECB to act as a source of funding of sovereign debt. The ECB 
succeeded to escape outright legal sanctions by linking its OMT 
program to the conditionality attached to Financial Stability 
Facility and the European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM). 
Financial matters can only partially come under full legal 
control because – as the old saying goes – without money the king 
loses his rights. Therefore, member counties must direct much 
more efforts towards good governance. The treaties, protocols and 
amendments serve only as guidelines. In the end, it is up to the 
individual nation state to conduct sound economic policies. On 




AbAndon or ConsolidAte tHe euro?
In order to make an evaluation whether to abandon the euro 
or not, the overall performance must be taken into account and 
not merely a transient crisis event. As to the basic macroeconomic 
indicators such as economic growth, inflation and the current 
account, the European system has shown a good performance 
in which all but one indicator – employment – has performed 
badly. Over the more than ten years of its existence the euro 
positioned itself as a strong currency backed by a high degree 
of price level stability. The average inflation rate has remained 
close to the aim of two percent per year and the current account 
has been largely in balance with only marginal deviations. It is 
mainly the unemployment rate, which gives reason for concern. 
As the comparison of the data of the individual countries shows, 
the unemployment rate reflects much more structural factors than 
cyclical impacts. It is not the euro, which produces unemployment 
in certain countries, but the structure of the national labor market. 
In this respect, too, the next major challenge is for many member 
countries to come up with reforms in a move to establish good 
governance. 
Institution building has been the trademark of the European 
economic and monetary integration process. Before the launch 
of the euro, there had been predecessors such as “the snake” and 
the European exchange rate mechanism. Under the name “ECU”, 
there was also an artificial European currency already in place long 
before the euro came into existence. The current crisis makes no 
exception as to how the authorities have reacted to the challenge. 
Historically, the process of European integration has made 
its major advances in periods of crises. This was the case at the 
time of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System when global 
monetary instability disrupted the integration of the common 
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market. Further major steps occurred in the face of the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union and with German unification. As it happened 
with the fragile new democracies in Southern Europe when these 
came “on board” to the European Union in the 1980s, political 
stabilization took place also with respect to the Eastern European 
country. In this view, the European Union is not only an economic 
success story for the original six members that founded the 
European Common Market in 1957, but over the course of 
time European integration has also become a major factor in 
making large parts of Europe more prosperous and democratic. 
ConClusion
As many times before, in the euro crisis as well, the real course 
of events proved the doomsayers wrong. Of course, creating and 
maintaining a common currency, which binds together a large 
group of highly diverse countries, has been no and never will be 
a cakewalk. For the future, many more challenges lie ahead. What 
matters in the end is the trade­off, the size of the margin by 
which the benefits of the euro outweigh its costs. In this respect, 
the calculus leaves little room for doubt. In terms of peace and 
prosperity, European integration has brought immense benefits 
for the continent. 
As it became apparent at the time of the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods System, common currency arrangements and 
finally a common money are necessary to keep the integration 
process going. In this respect, the euro is not an aim but a means. 
The logic runs from the euro as a means of deepening economic 
integration to economic integration as a means of maintaining 
peace and prosperity.
The so­called “euro crisis” represents one more of the series 
of challenges that Europe has to cope with. The response so far 
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has been to set up new institutions such as the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact. The implementation 
of its “Outright Monetary Transactions” program by the European 
Central Bank opened up the way for the ECB to act as a “lender­
of­the­last­resort. With the expansion of the European Union 
going on and more countries joining the euro, the acceptance of a 
common ideal of governance represents the next major task.
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